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Mr. George L. Mitchell, author of the article “The Uniform 
Commercial Code Updates Montana Sales Law,” is assistant 
professor of business administration specializing in law and 
government regulation at the University of Montana. He re­
ceived his B.A. degree from the University of Arizona and his 
LL.B. degree from the University of Montana School of Law. 
Professor Mitchell previously has contributed articles about 
bankruptcy in Montana (Montana Business Quarterly, Sum­
mer 1963) and legal considerations for corporations operating 
outside their home states (Montana Business Quarterly, Sum­
mer 1964). In a forthcoming issue, he will discuss changes in 
the law of warranties and remedies inaugurated by the Uniform 
Commercial Code in the chapter on Sales.
Dr. Norman E. Taylor’s article, “What Price Progress?” is a 
continuation of his discussion of “Living With Change” which 
appeared in the Spring 1965 issue of the Quarterly. Biographi­
cal data about Dr. Taylor also appeared in that issue. On Sep­
tember 1, he will become Director of the Bureau of Business 
and Economic Research.
The brief article on state and local taxes by Dr. John H. 
Wicks, assistant professor of economics, is the first of a series 
of factual commentaries on Montana’s tax system which he 
plans for the Quarterly. We are pleased to be able to give our 
readers this opportunity to improve their understanding of 
Montana’s tax situation.
Maxine C. Johnson is the author of the article on retail trade 
and of the brief comments on the current business outlook. Mrs. 
Johnson is the Assistant Director of the Bureau of Business and 
Economic Research and a frequent contributor to the Quarterly.
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The Uniform Commercial Code 
Updates Montana Sales Law
GEORGE MITCHELL 
Assistant Professor 
School of Business Administration 
University of Montana, Missoula
History of the U.C.C.
In 1963 the Uniform Commercial Code (let’s call it the U.C.C. 
for short) was enacted by the Thirty-Eighth Legislative As­
sembly1 and became effective in this state on January 1, 1965. 
Any businessman in Montana who has not apprised himself of 
the changes wrought by the enactment of the U.C.C. may be in 
for a lot of surprises. Here are a few samples of the pitfalls 
he will need to know about—many contracts once required to 
be in writing are now enforceable though only oral; one may 
now be bound by a contract which he did not sign and which 
contains terms different from or in addition to those which he 
offered, even though a term such as the price, which was prev­
iously essential to its enforcement, is omitted; and in 1965 the 
old rule that “an offer may be revoked any time before accept­
ance” no longer applies to written offers signed by merchants. 
Under the new U.C.C. rules, shipment of goods to the buyer 
may constitute an acceptance of the buyer’s offer even though 
the goods do not conform to the terms of the offer; and con­
tracts required by the statute of frauds to be in writing are no 
longer totally enforceable, though oral, when they have been 
partially performed. Any one of these sudden changes could 
bring the uninformed businessman face-to-face with the legal 
maxim which often proves the most costly to learn—that “ig- 
norance of the law is no excuse.”
The law is a living thing. It must grow and change to meet
'Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, Chapter 264, Laws of 1963.
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the needs of the society which it serves. If a law once passed 
were unchangeable, it could stifle the development of that very 
segment of society which it was enacted to serve. It was a rec­
ognition of the need for change in the law pertaining to com­
mercial transactions which led to the Uniform Commercial 
Code. The changes in modern business due to technological ad­
vancement, experience, and the increased sophistication of the 
members of the business community made it imperative that 
the law be changed to keep abreast of new developments. The 
Uniform Commercial Code itself, in Section 87A-1-102, as 
adopted by Montana, states that its “underlying purposes and 
policies” are:
(a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing com­
mercial transactions;
(b) to permit the continued expansion of commercial prac­
tices through custom, usage, and agreement of the parties;
(c) to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions.
The first effort on a national scale to accomplish these pur­
poses began over twenty years ago. Initially the idea was to 
revise and update the many uniform acts which dealt with the 
various facets of commercial law; but at an annual meeting of 
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws in 1940, it was proposed that one uniform code treating 
all aspects of commercial law be drafted. Y7ork on the Article 
on Sales began in 1942, and in 1945, an Editorial Board com­
posed of representatives of the National Conference of Com­
missioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Law In­
stitute started work on the entire project. With the aid of 
hundreds of judges, lawyers, educators, and businessmen from 
all oyer the country, and a grant of over $275,000 from the 
Maurice and Laura Falk Foundation, the first completed U.C.C. 
was issued in the fall of 1951. But only the state of Pennsyl­
vania, in 1953, enacted this nationally conceived U.C.C. After 
extensive study and revision by the New York Law Revision 
Commission and the Editorial Board, and the issuance of a 
revised U.C.C. late in 1956, two more states (Massachusetts in 
September of 1957 and Kentucky in 1958) enacted the U.C.C. 
Further revisions were made and the U.C.C. was republished 
as the “1958 Official Text,” which was then adopted by fifteen 
more states. However, the fact that nearly all of these states 
made their own modifications to the Official Text impaired
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uniformity among the several states, and led to the grant of 
another $125,000 by the Maurice and Laura Falk Foundation 
to endow a permanent Editorial Board to review and approve 
suggested changes in the Official Text. Due to the efforts of 
this permanent Editorial Board a new “1962 Official Text” was 
issued; it is substantially the U.C.C. adopted by the Thirty- 
Eighth Legislative Assembly of Montana in 1963.
By September of this year, when the U.C.C. is to become 
effective in Nebraska, the U.C.C. will be effective in 29 states. 
By the end of the year 1965 it is anticipated that many more 
states will adopt similar codes. The only states which have 
neither passed the U.C.C. nor had such bills introduced this 
year are South Dakota, Vermont, Idaho, Louisiana, Arizona, 
and Mississippi.
The scope of the U.C.C. as adopted by Montana may best be 
understood by observing that it contains ten separate chapters. 
Their subjects include Sales, Commercial Paper, Bank Deposits 
and Collections, Letters of Credit, Bank Transfers, Documents 
of Title, Investment Securities, and Secured Transactions. The 
U.C.C. achieves a new dimension in bringing together areas of 
commercial law which had been separately treated. The sub­
jects of more than a half dozen previously separate uniform 
acts and innumerable individual statutes have been superceded 
by the new collective U.C.C. The framers achieved a new con­
tinuity and interrelation of the various aspects of the law re­
lating to commercial transactions and eliminated many incon­
sistencies resulting from piecemeal enactment and amendment. 
The resulting comprehensive coverage is an improvement both 
because it makes for uniformity among the states, and because 
the bulk of commercial law may now be found in a single 
source in any state which has adopted the U.C.C.
Before the enactment of the U.C.C. in Montana, for example, 
it was usually necessary to examine several sources in order 
to determine what the law was with regard to any given trans­
action. More time and more money had to be spent to find an 
answer even when one employed an attorney. In addition, fre­
quently no reliable conclusion could be drawn because the 
sources were often ambiguous or inconsistent. Montana com­
mercial law simply had not been as highly developed by the 
courts of this state as it has been by the courts of the more 
populous and industrialized states. Many commercial law ques­
tions had never been answered by the Montana courts, and in 
the absence of an applicable statute could only be answered if
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at all, by reference to the opinions of courts of other states. 
Even if a case in another state could be found which answered 
the same question which had been raised in Montana, there 
was no certainty that the courts of this state would reach the 
same conclusion. Under the U.C.C., however, the extensive ex­
perience of other states and the best of all the opinions of all 
of the courts have been codified into this one Uniform Com­
mercial Code. The adoption of this U.C.C. thus brings Montana 
up to date with the best commercial law of other states and 
makes further economic development possibilities more legally 
inviting.
The Scope of the Chapter on Sales
Because of the wide scope of the U.C.C. a detailed discus­
sion of all of its articles and provisions is impossible in an 
article of this nature; such an undertaking would require sev­
eral volumes. This discussion, therefore, is confined to Chap­
ter 2 on “Sales” and does not deal with the changes made by 
that Chapter in the law of warranties or the remedies avail­
able to buyer and seller, which will be treated by a subsequent 
article. The discussion herein concentrates on those sections 
which inaugurate the greatest changes in the laws which affect 
Montana businessmen.
The first problem presented by Chapter 2 is to determine 
which transactions fall within its provisions, for if the trans­
action does not fall within Chapter 2 its provisions do not 
apply. Chapter 2 is limited in its application to “transactions in 
goods”2 which was intended to mean tangible goods moveable 
at the time of their identification to the contract.3 The chapter 
includes contracts involving timber, minerals, or structures if 
they are to be severed by the seller,4 and contracts involving 
crops or other things attached to the realty which are capable 
of severance without material harm “regardless of who is to 
effect the severance.”5
Contracts which are specifically precluded from the purview 
of Chapter 2 by the U.C.C. are those involving secured transac-
2Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, Section 87A-2-102.
3Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, Section 87A-2-105.
‘Ibid., Section 87A-2-107 (1).
5Uniform Commercial Code, 1962 Official Text, Section 2-107, Com­
ment 2.
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tions such as chattel mortgages or conditional sales contracts0 
which are covered by Chapter 9; those involving investment se­
curities* 7 which are covered by Chapter 8; and those involving 
things in action, such as the assignment of a contract right or 
a tort claim for a consideration. Thus Chapter 2 applies only 
to sales of movable goods as opposed to services, real property, 
or intangible things in action, and is further limited to sales of 
goods which do not involve a security agreement. To the extent 
that Chapter 2 or any other Chapter of the U.C.C. applies to a 
contract the prior law is superceded,8 but as to those contracts 
or those matters within a contract for which the U.C.C. makes 
no provision, the prior law remains unchanged and applicable.
Higher Standards Imposed on Merchants
The U.C.C. introduces a novel concept into commercial law 
by applying different rules to merchants than to nonmerchants 
in fifteen of the Sections in Chapter 2. A person may be a 
“merchant” in one transaction but not another. A merchant is 
defined as one who is a dealer in the goods, or who holds him­
self out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the goods or 
practices involved, or who employs an agent or broker whom 
he holds out as having such knowledge or skill.9 For example, 
a person who owns a hardware store is a merchant as to sales 
of hardware in the ordinary course of his business, but not as 
to the sale of his personal car or his used delivery truck.
In most instances these sections impose a higher standard 
on merchants regardless of whether they are dealing with one 
another or with a nonmerchant. This reflects a trend away 
from prior legal concepts which treated the merchant and non­
merchant equally. It has long been felt that the merchant’s 
knowledge of commerce, and the fact that the merchants gen­
erally set the mercantile standards, meant that to treat them 
equally with nonmerchants was to place the merchants in a 
favored position. The old Common Law . concept of “caveat 
emptor” or “let the buyer beware” has been recognized as un­
workable in a modern business context for some time. Inroads 
on the stronger position of the merchant seller were made 
through the imposition of implied warranties and by judicial 
rules of contract construction—such as that rule which requires 
that a contract be construed most strongly against the party who
1962 Official Text, Section 2-102, Comment 1.
Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, Section 87A-2-105 (1).
hJbid., Section 87A-1-103.
“Ibid., Section 87A-2-104.
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drafted it, which of course is generally the merchant. But under 
the U.C.C., for the first time, merchants are separately classified 
and specifically subjected to a different set of rules than the 
nonmerchants. For example, unless a contract requires ship­
ment by carrier or delivery by a bailee without movement of 
the goods, the risk of loss passes to the buyer on tender of de­
livery of the goods if the seller is a nonmerchant. If, however, 
the seller is a merchant, the risk of loss does not pass to the 
buyer until he has actually received the goods.10
Another example of the new U.C.C. law is the section which 
prevents a merchant from revoking a written offer for the time 
stated therein or a reasonable time if there is no time stated.11 
Nonmerchants may still revoke an offer any time before it is 
accepted unless some consideration has been paid to keep it 
open. Also, in the case of nonmerchants, merely sending a letter 
confirming a prior oral agreement does not satisfy the Statute 
of Frauds which requires a sufficient writing signed by the 
party sought to be charged. But if the oral contract is between 
merchants, the Statute of Frauds is satisfied by a confirmatory 
letter from one to the other, though not signed by the recipient, 
unless the recipient objects in writing within ten days.12
Moreover, a seller who is a merchant impliedly warrants that 
goods of the kind in which he regularly deals shall be free of 
third-party claims of infringement13 and that they are mer­
chantable,14 whereas a nonmerchant seller is not charged with 
such warranties.
The dual standard goes further in that terms in an accept­
ance which once would have terminated the offer because they 
were in addition to or different from the terms of the offer no 
longer terminate the offer and may actually become a part of 
the contract if it is between merchants.15 This dual standard 
may also change the very nature of a transaction from that in­
tended by the parties if a “merchant” is involved. For example, 
a seller who delivers “on consignment” in order to retain title 
to the goods and thus protect them from the creditors of the 
party to whom they are delivered may find that such a deliv-
10Ibid., Section 87A-2-509 (3).
“ibid., Section 87A-2-205.
“ibid., Section 87A-2-201 (2).
“ibid., Section 87A-2-312 (3).
“ibid., Section 87A-2-314 (1).
“Subsequently discussed wider heading “The Battle of the Conflicting 
Forms.
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ery to a merchant who deals in such goods may be deemed a 
“sale or return” which would transfer title to the merchant 
and give his general creditors rights in the goods superior to 
those of the seller, unless certain precautions were taken.10 In 
addition, the dual standard imposes on a merchant buyer the 
duty of following any reasonable instructions with respect to 
the return of rejected goods if they are in his possession and 
the seller has no agent or place of business at the market of 
rejection17 or if the sale was “on approval.”18 Nor may a mer- 
cant who has rejected goods rely upon any unstated defect to 
justify his rejection if the seller requested in writing a state­
ment of all defects.19 If the merchant fails to list the defect upon 
which he intended to rely, he may not use such defect as justi­
fication for his rejection or to show any breach on the part of 
the seller.
The recognition of the merchant’s greater knowledge of busi­
ness matters is more particularly seen in the section of the 
U.C.C. which states that any clause in a contract requiring a 
signed writing to modify that written agreement must be sep­
arately signed by any nonmerchant who is dealing with a mer­
chant.29 Such a clause limits the right of modification, by means 
other than a signed writing, between merchants whether it is 
separately signed by the merchant or not. Merchants are pre­
sumed to be aware of such clauses and their effect, but the sep­
arate signature of the nonmerchant is required as evidence of 
his actual awareness.
The above examples indicate how the dual standard imposed 
by the Code may result in a higher standard being imposed on 
merchants, but not all of the sections employing such a dual 
standard have this result. In certain instances the dual standard 
operates to the advantage of the merchant. For example, a 
merchant buyer who sells rejected goods on behalf of the seller 
is entitled to a commission and reimbursement of expenses 
out of the proceeds.21
Whether the position of any Montana businessman with re­
spect to any given transaction will be enhanced or whether he 














16 MONTANA BUSINESS QUARTERLY
tions of Chapter 2 which embody the new dual standard can 
only be determined by a careful analysis of the facts of said 
transaction and the sections applicable thereto. However, even 
the cursory treatment given the examples above indicates the 
importance of being aware of the existence of such a dual stan­
dard. The outcome of a whole series of transactions may hinge 
upon a determination of whether one or more of the parties 
thereto is a “merchant.”
Changes in the Formation of a Contract
The Statute of Frauds, which requires certain agreements 
to be reduced to a writing of a certain content, has existed in 
all states in one form or another since the colonization of this 
country. The U.C.C. does not do away with the Statute of 
Frauds, but materially changes it in several important respects. 
It has changed the circumstances under which a writing is 
necessary, and the type of writing required, as well as the 
exceptions to that requirement. Prior to the U.C.C. the Mon­
tana Statute of Frauds22 required all agreements to buy or sell 
personal property, including things in action, for a price of 
$200 or more to be in writing and subscribed by the party 
against whom enforcement is sought. In the absence of such a 
writing the contract was unenforceable. The writing had to 
contain all of the material elements of the agreement, though 
they could be generally stated.23 Such a writing or memoran­
dum had to be so drafted as to permit the court to ascertain 
the essentials of the contract without resort to evidence other 
than the writing itself. If, for example, the price were omitted, 
the contract would be unenforceable. Under the U.C.C. Statute 
of Frauds24 only agreements involving a price of $500 or more 
need be written. Agreements involving a sale of investment 
securities rather than a sale of goods are specially treated by a 
different section which requires contracts involving a sale of 
securities to be in writing regardless of the dollar amount of the 
contract.25 In addition, the formal requirements as to the con­
tent of the writing itself have been substantially liberalized by 
the U.C.C. Under the new code the writing need not contain all *2
“Ibid., Section 74-201.
*Lewis v . Aronow, 77 Montana 348, 355, 251 Pac. 146, (1926).
2‘Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, Section 87A-2-201.
*Ibid., Section 87A-8-319.
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of the material terms of the contract; instead it need only show 
that a contract was signed by the party sought to be charged, 
and specify the quantity.20 The required statement of the quan­
tity need not be accurate, but any recovery will be limited to 
the amount which is actually stated. Thus, under the U.C.C., a 
contract need not indicate which party is the seller or buyer, 
the price, the precise quantity, the time or place of delivery, 
the quality of the goods, or any particular warranties.27 Per­
haps the most important of these changes is the removal of the 
requirement that price be stated in an executory contract, that 
is, a contract not yet fully performed by the parties. Prior to 
the adoption of the U.C.C., if the buyer ordered and received 
the goods and no mention was made of price, a reasonable price, 
such as the market price or the price customarily charged by 
the seller for like goods, was presumed. If, however, the con­
tract was executory, in that the goods had not yet been de­
livered, the contract would then have been held too indefinite 
to enforce because the price term was omitted. Under the 
U.C.C. an open price term may be used without worrying about 
mdefiniteness, for Section 87A-2-305 of the U.C.C. as adopted by 
Montana provides:
(1) The parties if they so intend can conclude a contract for 
sale even though the price is not settled. In such a case the 
price is a reasonable price at the time for delivery if
(a) nothing is said as to price; or
(b) the price is left to be agreed by the parties and they 
fail to agree; or
(c) the price is to be fixed in terms of some agreed market 
or other standard as set or recorded by a third person
agency and it is not so set or recorded.
(2) A price to be fixed by the seller or by the buyer means 
a price for him to fix in good faith.
(3) When a price left to be fixed otherwise than by agreement
th® parties fails.to be fixed through fault of one party 
the other may at his option treat the contract as cancelled 
or himself fix a reasonable price.
(4) Where, however, the parties intend not to be bound unless 
the price be fixed or agreed and it is not fixed or agreed 
there is no contract. In such a case the buyer must return 
any goods already received or if unable so to do must pay 
their reasonable value at the time of delivery and the seller 
must return any portion of the price paid on account.
"m en tT  C°mmercial Code’ 1962 Official Text, Section 2-201, Com- 
*Ibid.
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In addition to liberalizing the formal requirements under 
the Statute of Frauds, the U.C.C. changes certain of the excep­
tions to the operation of that statute. Under the old Statute of 
Frauds partial performance of a contract made it enforceable 
in its entirety whether in writing or not. For example, if part 
of the goods are received and accepted by the buyer or part of 
the price were paid by the buyer and accepted by the seller 
the contract was fully enforceable despite the fact it was only 
oral and not in writing as required by the Statute of Frauds. 
This partial performance was held to be sufficient evidence of 
the contractual intent of the parties to obviate the necessity 
of producing a writing as evidence. Thus, by virtue of this ex­
ception to the old Statute of Frauds, a contract otherwise un­
enforceable because not in writing could be completely en­
forced if partially performed.28 Under the U.C.C. this type of 
partial performance still qualifies as an exception to the Statute 
of Frauds, but the contract is only exempted from the require­
ment of a writing to the extent actually performed. That is, 
“partial performance as a substitute for the required memo­
randum (writing) can validate the contract only for the goods 
which have been accepted or for which payment has been 
made and accepted.”29 Thus if only $100 of a purchase price 
of $1,000 has been paid on an oral contract which the Statute 
of Frauds requires to be in writing, the contract would have 
been enforceable to the extent of $1,000 worth of goods under 
the old statute, whereas, under the U.C.C. it would be enforce­
able only for $100 worth of goods.
Another example of the limitation of exceptions to the Stat­
ute of Frauds may be seen in the U.C.C. treatment of the ex­
ception generally made as to goods to be specially manufac­
tured. In Montana,30 as in most states, a contract for the special 
manufacture of goods was exempted from the operation of the 
Statute of Frauds. This exception was based on the inequity 
of permitting the buyer to refuse the goods because his order 
was not in writing. Expenses incurred, and time wasted in tool­
ing up or acquiring materials or manufacturing unique items 
not readily resalable made it manifestly inequitable to permit
' Revised. Codes of Montana, 1947, Section 74-201; Spurgeon v. Imperial 
Elevator, 99 Mont. 432, 43 Pac. (2d)891.
*Uniform Commercial Code, 1962 Official Text, Section 2-201. Com- I  
ment 2.
30Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, Section 74-202.
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a buyer to raise the defense of the Statute of Frauds. Under the 
; prior law such a contract for the special manufacture of goods 
was totally enforceable from the moment the contract was 
formed though it was for a price required by the Statute of 
Frauds to be in writing. Under the U.C.C. such a contract is 
f also enforceable even though not in writing, but only if “the 
goods are not suitable for sale to others in the ordinary course 
of the seller’s business and the seller, before notice of repudia­
tion is received and under circumstances which reasonably in- 
i dicate that the goods are for the buyer, has made either a sub­
stantial beginning of their manufacture or commitments for 
their procurement.”31 Thus, under the U.C.C., the manufacturer 
must have begun manufacture or made commitments for the 
procurement of the goods before the contract is enforceable if 
not in writing; whereas, under the law before the U.C.C. no 
I such change of position on the part of the manufacturer was 
required.
There is one addition in the Statute of Frauds under the 
U.C.C. which has no counterpart in the prior law. If an oral 
contract is admitted in court, by the party against whom en­
forcement is sought, in a written pleading filed with the court 
or by oral testimony or stipulation, no writing is necessary to 
make it enforceable even though it was required by the Statute 
of Frauds to be in writing. It is stated in Section 87A-2-201 (3) 
(b) of the U.C.C. as adopted by Montana that:
ft
(3) A contract which does not satisfy the requirements of sub­
section (1) but which is valid in other respects is enforce- 
I . able
(b) if the party against whom enforcement is sought ad- 
mits in his pleading, testimony or otherwise in court 
that a contract for sale was made, but the contract is 
not enforceable under this provision beyond the quan­
tity of goods admitted . . .
| ^  should be noted that this exception to the Statute of Frauds 
which makes a contract admitted in the prescribed fashion en­
forceable though not in writing is limited to the quantity of 
goods actually admitted.
’’Ibid., Section 87A-2-201.
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Changes in the Principles of Contract Law
The Firm Offer Problem
In the previous discussion of the higher standard imposed by 
the U.C.C. on “merchants,” it was pointed out that when it 
concerns “merchants” the prior law with respect to revocation 
of an offer has been changed. Prior to the U.C.C. an offer could 
be revoked at any time before its acceptance. This was true 
even though the person making the offer had promised to keep 
the offer open for a specified time, unless the person to whom 
the offer was made paid for the privilege of having it held 
open, and thus acquired an “option,” or unless he materially 
changed his position in reliance on the promise to hold the 
offer open so as to justify the courts holding the person who 
made the offer to his promise in order to avoid an unfair result. 
In the absence of payment therefore, an offeror’s promise to 
hold an offer open was regarded as a mere unenforceable gra­
tuity. However, under the U.C.C. a written offer signed by a 
“merchant” which contains an assurance that it will be held 
open is irrevocable for the period specified therein, or in the 
absence of a specified time, for a reasonable time not to exceed 
three months.32 This is the case regardless of whether the per­
son to whom the offer was made has paid any consideration or 
has acted to his detriment in reliance on the offeror’s assur­
ance that the offer would be held open. It is suggested, there­
fore, that form contracts be checked to determine whether they 
contain wording which would constitute an irrevocable offer 
under the U.C.C., and that merchants refrain from giving writ­
ten assurances by which they do not desire to be bound.
It should also be noted that buyers interested in an irrev­
ocable offer may obtain one by providing the “merchant” of­
feror with a form containing a written promise to hold it open, 
but the provision making the offer irrevocable must be separ­
ately signed by the person making the offer to be effective 
when the person to whom the offer is made supplies the form.33 
Thus both buyers and sellers should carefully investigate this 
section of the U.C.C.
The Battle of the Conflicting Forms
The rigidity of the common law rules of offer and acceptance
**Ibid.f Section 87A-2-205. 
831Ibid.
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in some instances created difficulties with respect to modern 
business transactions. One such difficulty has come to be called 
“the battle of the conflicting forms.” The use of printed forms 
for all transactions of a given class by modern businesses has 
become the rule rather than the exception. Though their use 
is often fully justified by resultant savings of both time and 
expense, such forms, however carefully drafted, have seldom 
been tailored to fit the individual transaction involved. Gen­
erally, both the seller’s quotation and the buyer’s response by 
purchase order are on such forms, and frequently the standard 
clauses used therein by the seller and the buyer will be in con­
flict. This presents the problem of whether there is in fact a 
contract, and if there is a contract what its terms and conditions 
are. Do the buyer’s forms or those of the seller prevail?
Under the common law, if the terms of the acceptance did not 
coincide exactly with the terms of the offer, there was no con­
tract and the attempted acceptance became merely a counter­
offer. The old rule was stated in the case of J. Neils Lumber Co. 
v. Farmers Lumber Co. (88 Montana 392, 397, 293 Pac. 288,1930) 
by the Montana Supreme Court as follows:
The rule is well settled that, in order to form a contract, there 
must be an offer by one party and an unconditional accept­
ance of it by the other in accordance with its terms . . . (cita­
tions omitted) and that, if the acceptance falls within or goes 
beyond the terms of the offer or makes a condition at vari­
ance with the proposal, there is no contract and the transac­
tion amounts to one of the proposals and counter proposals 
only . . . (citations omitted).
The counteroffer terminated the original offer and there could 
be no contract unless the counteroffer were subsequently ac­
cepted. The conflict of terms between the offer and the ac­
ceptance meant there was no contract at common law, and it
is this rule which the U.C.C. has changed, as the following will 
illustrate.
Usually a seller’s quotation does not contain a promise to 
sell and is regarded merely as a solicitation of an offer. The 
buyer s purchase order is the offer and the existence of a con­
tract and the terms thereof will be determined by the manner 
in which the seller responds to that offer. At common law and 
nder the U.C.C., if the seller responds with an acceptance 
which does not create a conflict of term s-such as signing an 
acknowledgement without additional or different terms—there 
is a contract on the buyer’s terms as set forth in the purchase
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order. If the seller uses his own acknowledgement—which con­
tains terms in addition to or different from those in the buyer’s 
purchase order—there is no contract at common law, but there 
is a contract under the new code. Section 87A-2-207 (1) of the 
U.C.C. as adopted by Montana, states:
A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a 
written confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time 
operates as an acceptance even though it states terms additional 
to or different from those offered or agreed upon, unless ac­
ceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the ad­
ditional or different terms. (Emphasis supplied.)
The effect of the additional or different terms in the seller’s 
acknowledgment on the contract thus formed is governed by 
subsection (2) of Section 87A-2-207 of the U.C.C. as adopted by 
Montana, as follows:
(2) The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for 
addition to the contract. Between merchants such terms be­
come part of the contract unless:
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of 
the offer;
(b) they materially alter it; or
(c) notification of objection to them has already been 
given or is given within a reasonable time after notice 
of them is received. (Emphasis supplied.)
However, under the U.C.C., if the contract is not between mer­
chants the additional or different terms in the seller’s acknowl­
edgement merely fall by the wayside unless the buyer accepts 
them. If the buyer does not accept them, then the contract con­
tains only the terms of the buyer’s purchase order and the 
seller will find that the terms of his acknowledgement are of 
no avail. If, however, the contract is between merchants the 
buyer should recognize that unless his offer expressly limited 
acceptance to the terms of the offer, those additional terms 
which do not materially alter the contract become binding 
upon him unless he makes a timely objection, whether he be­
lieves he accepted them or not. If the buyer did in fact limit 
acceptance to the terms of the offer and the seller’s acknowl­
edgement contains terms in addition to or different from those 
in the buyer s purchase order, then there is no contract at all.
Even when, due to a conflict of terms, the writings of the 
parties fail to create a contract, a contract may be created by
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the conduct of the parties. At common law, an acknowledge­
ment by the seller which differed from the terms of the pur­
chase order was regarded as a counteroffer which terminated 
the buyers’ offer and no contract was formed. If, however, the 
seller shipped the goods and the buyer accepted them the buyer 
was held to have thereby accepted the counteroffer and was 
consequently bound by the terms of the seller’s acknowledge­
ment which had differed in terms from his purchase order. This 
legal principle which gave the seller the “last shot” at de­
termining the terms of the contract, has been changed by sub­
section (3) of Section 87A-2-207 of the U.C.C. as adopted by 
Montana which states:
(3) Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of 
a contract is sufficient to establish a contract for sale al­
though the writings of the parties do not otherwise establish 
a contract. In such case the terms of the particular contract 
consist of those terms on which the writings of the parties 
agree, together with any supplementary terms incorpo­
rated under any other provisions of this Act. (Emphasis 
supplied.)
Thus the U.C.C. does not impose the terms of the seller’s ac­
knowledgment upon the buyer. The terms of the contract are 
those upon which the purchase order and the acknowledge­
ment agree. All additional or different terms upon which there 
was no agreement are inoperative. The vacuum created by dis­
carding those terms upon which there was no agreement may 
be filled by applying terms generally imposed by the U.C.C. 
to operate in the absence of any agreement by the parties to 
the contrary. For example, in the event the provisions of the 
purchase order and the acknowledgement conflict with refer­
ence to the time at which the risk of loss is to be transferred 
from the seller to the buyer, then the risk of loss will pass in 
the manner specified by the U.C.C., as though the parties had 
completely omitted any reference thereto.
The Unilateral Contract “Trick”
Under the prior law a seller who received an order to ship 
goods was at liberty to regard the order as either an offer for 
a bilateral contract (a promise to buy in return for a promise 
to ship conforming goods) or a unilateral contract (a promise 
to buy in return for the act of shipping conforming goods) If 
the seller treated the order as an offer for a bilateral contract 
and promised to ship conforming goods a contract was formed
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by his promise, and the subsequent shipment of nonconform- 
*nS goods would constitute a breach of that promise for which 
the buyer had redress. But to form a unilateral contract, for the 
breach of which the seller could be held liable, the offer had to 
be accepted by performance of the specific act requested, 
that of shipping conforming goods. Thus the seller who know­
ingly shipped nonconforming goods in response to the buyer’s 
order in the hope of unloading them on the buyer could avoid 
liability by claiming such a shipment was not the shipment of 
conforming goods requested by the buyer, and therefore did not 
constitute an acceptance of the offer, and that there was, there­
fore, no contract, and consequently no breach of contract for 
which he could be held liable.
By employing this “trick” defense a seller was free to ship 
any inferior, different, or substandard goods he chose in the 
hope that the buyer would be in sufficiently critical need of 
the goods to accept them on arrival. The buyer, on the other 
hand, was without recourse when he received such goods in 
response to his order, whether he accepted them or not. The 
U.C.C. has done away with this “trick” defense. Now a ship­
ment of nonconforming goods is both an acceptance and a 
breach of the contract formed by such acceptance unless the 
seller notifies the buyer that the shipment is only offered “as 
an accommodation to the buyer.”34 Because of this rule any 
Montana businessman who desires to ship goods similar to 
those ordered, because he does not have conforming goods in 
stock and wants to “help” the buyer if he can by providing 
goods which may serve the purpose, should immediately notify 
the buyer that the shipment is for his accommodation. Other­
wise, though he had the best of intentions, he may find himself 
being held liable for breach of contract.
Modification of Contracts
Under the prior law any promise was a mere gratuity and 
unenforceable unless there was some consideration therefore. 
A modification of an existing contract was regarded as a new 
and separate promise and some consideration for that promise 
was required to make it enforceable. This rule had a tendency 
to protect the original agreement from fraudulent or bad faith 
claims of modification by either of the parties thereto. A seller 
could not, for example, claim that the buyer had agreed to ex-
“Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, Section 87A-2-2-6 (1) (b).
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tend the time of delivery or to accept a different brand or grade 
of goods than that specified in the contract unless said seller 
could prove both that the buyer had in fact made the promise 
and that there was consideration running to the buyer for this 
new promise. Under the “pre-existing duty rule” the seller 
would be doing no more than that which he was already obli­
gated to do—deliver the goods—and this performance of his 
pre-existing duty under the original agreement was not con­
sideration for the buyer’s new promise to extend the time of 
delivery or to accept a different grade or brand of goods. Un­
fortunately this rule placed parties who had relied in good 
faith upon a promised modification in an awkward position, 
since they could not enforce the agreement unless they could 
show some consideration other than performing that which 
they were already obligated to do.
Under the U.C.C. an agreement modifying a contract for the 
sale of goods needs no consideration to be binding,35 and this 
applies to an agreement to rescind or cancel as well as an agree­
ment to modify.36 The U.C.C. has endeavored to prevent false 
assertions of oral modification by providing that the parties 
may stipulate in the contract that it is not to be rescinded or 
’ m°dified except by a signed writing,37 and that the modification 
must be in writing and signed by the party sought to be charged 
| Jt falls within the Statute of Frauds.38 When a nonmerchant 
is dealing with a merchant, however, any clause requiring writ­
ten modification in a form supplied by the merchant must be 
: separately signed by the nonmerchant.39 Consequently, Mon­
tana “merchants” who desire to limit modification to a writing 
should provide a space beneath such a clause in their form con- 
tracts for the signature of the nonmerchants with whom they 
deal. However, even though a written modification is required 
§• y a specific provision in the original agreement or because the 
modification falls within the Statute of Frauds, a Montana bus- 
| messman cannot, under the U.C.C., rest assured that his oral 
promises modifying the agreement cannot be enforced against 
im. If, for example, a buyer, knowing that both the original 
agreement and the Statute of Frauds require any modification 
! 10 be in writing, orally promises to extend the time for deliv-
I
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ery from ten to twenty days, said buyer may be held to have 
waived his right to delivery within ten days; for under the 
U.C.C., though the contract specifically requires a written mod­
ification, an oral modification may operate as a waiver.40 That 
is, the buyer may be held to have waived his right to perform­
ance of the original terms of the agreement by orally agreeing 
to other terms. Having made such a waiver, the buyer could 
still retract it by notifying the seller before the seller has ma­
terially altered his position in reliance on the waiver that strict 
performance of the original terms will be required.41 The best 
way to avoid problems of oral modification and waivers is to 
specifically require in the original agreement that any modifi­
cation thereof must be in writing and then to make no subse­
quent oral commitments. Then any intended subsequent modi­
fication may be clearly and definitely reduced to writing and 
will be enforceable under the U.C.C. with or without con­
sideration.
Assignments
Another change resulting from the adoption of the U.C.C. in 
Montana comes under the law of assignments. Upon entering 
into a contract the parties thereto acquire certain rights and 
have imposed on them certain duties or obligations. A seller, 
for example, has the obligation to transfer the goods to the 
buyer and the right to receive the price when he has done so. 
The prior law has long permitted the transfer of these rights 
and obligations to a third person who was not a party to the 
contract by means of an assignment. Prior to the U.C.C., how­
ever, a firm distinction was made between the assignment of 
rights and the delegation of duties or obligations. This distinc­
tion was based on the recognition that contract rights generally 
involve merely the payment of money whereas the duties of 
performance may involve personal credit or personal abilities. 
It generally makes little difference to whom the money must 
be paid, but it may make a great deal of difference who is to 
render the performance for which the payment was made. For 
this reason, in Montana, as in most jurisdictions, it has been 
held in the past that a general assignment of a contract trans­
ferred the rights but did not result in the delegation of the
wIbid. (4). 
"Ibid. (5).
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obligations to the party to whom the rights were assigned.42 
The party receiving the assignment acquired the rights free 
and clear of any obligations unless he expressly assumed said 
obligations.
The U.C.C. adopts a more liberal position and attempts to 
make both rights and duties more freely assignable. Section 
87A-2-210 (4) of the U.C.C. as adopted by Montana states:
An assignment of “the contract” or of “all of my rights under 
the contract” or an assignment in similar general terms is an 
assignment of rights and unless the language or the circum­
stances (as in an assignment for security) indicate the con­
trary, it is a delegation of performance of the duties of the 
assignor and its acceptance by the assignee constitutes a prom­
ise by him to perform those duties. This promise is enforceable 
by either the assignor or the other party to the original contract.
Thus, under the U.C.C., one who accepts a general assignment 
of a contract acquires not only the right to receive payment but 
the duty to perform.
The parties are, however, still permitted to prevent assign­
ment of either rights or duties by so providing in the contract, 
cut even here the new law operates in favor of more freely 
assignable rights and duties, for Section 87A-2-210 (3) of the 
U.C.C. as adopted by Montana provides:
Unless the circumstances indicate the contrary, a prohibition of 
assignment of “the contract” is to be construed as b a r r i n g  
the delegation to the assignee of the assignor’s performance.
Under this section the old policy of using a generally worded 
clause to prohibit assignment will only prevent assignment of
neithprfh’ H°lthe nglLtS- Therefore> ^  the parties intend that neither the duties nor the rights should be assignable they must
onlTKi£f \£ S 3 Seneral^prohibition against assignment will do
E ;,C!b'-In addltlon> should be noted that the as-
if* +°if CGrta“  ri/ hts cannot be Prevented no matter how 
carefully the parties draft a clause prohibiting the assignment
“  fa's 87A' 2-210 <2) °f the U C C- as a d o p t e d " "
A right to damages for breach of the whole contract or a rieht 
arising out of the assignor’s due performance of his entire obli­
gation can be assigned despite agreement otherwise.
"Apple v. Edwards, 92 Mont. 524, 16 Pac I2dl 700  noioi ™ __
L.no|ln National Life durance  Co,
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Thus, under the U.C.C. a right to bring suit for damages for 
breach of the whole contract or for payment for complete per­
formance of the contract is assignable notwithstanding an 
agreement to the contrary. Another section of the U.C.C. treats 
accounts receivable in a similar manner. Section 87A-9-318 (4) 
states:
A term in any contract between an account debtor and an 
assignor which prohibits assignment of an account or contract 
right to which they are parties is ineffective.
These changes in the law of assignments made by the U.C.C. 
and the consequent shift in the direction of more freely assign­
able rights and duties are perhaps best explained by the official 
comment to one of the Sections, which states:
This gradual and largely unacknowledged shift in legal doc­
trine has taken place in response to economic need: as accounts 
and contract rights have become the collateral which secures 
an ever increasing number of financing transactions, it has been 
necessary to reshape the law so that these intangibles, like nego­
tiable instruments and negotiable documents of title, can be 
freely assigned. (Uniform Commercial Code, 1962 Official Text, 
Section 9-318, Comment 4.)
Unconscionable Contract Clauses
The U.C.C. has also changed the law with respect to the en­
forcement of unconscionable (unreasonable) contract clauses. 
The general rules of contract law were formulated with the 
intent of binding a man rigidly to his agreement. To permit a 
party to attempt to avoid his obligation or to seek to have the 
courts revise it for him just because the agreement into which 
he freely entered proved to work a hardship or to be unprofit­
able would destroy the value of contracts altogether. The posi­
tion of the Montana Supreme Court with respect to enforce­
ment of clauses which might seem unreasonable was stated in 
the following manner:
In this instance the defendant contracted to pay the plaintiff 
for value, and whether he made a good or bad bargain is not 
for the courts to determine. Rather it becomes the duty of the 
courts to enforce such contracts . . . (citations omitted) not 
to make new ones for the parties, however unreasonable the 
terms may appear . . . (citations). Merely because the defend­
ant may have reason to regret his bargain affords him no 
ground to avoid the obligation of his contract. (McConnell v. 
Blackley, 66 Mont. 510, 515, 214 Pac. 64 [1923].)
But there are occasions when to enforce a contract to the
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letter would be to reach an unconscionable and unjust result. 
In most instances these occasions arise when one party has 
taken advantage of the ignorance, culpability, or unfortunate 
position of another. Frequently the courts were faced with the 
problem of finding some justification for refusing to enforce 
such agreements strictly to the letter. In the absence of fraud, 
duress, undue influence, or some other valid defense against 
such enforcement, the courts would often resort to twisting the 
rules of offer and acceptance or consideration or other contract 
principles in order to reach an equitable result. Consistent ap­
plication of clearly defined rules of law under these circum­
stances was impossible, and the result often supported the old 
adage that “hard cases make bad law.”
The U.C.C. approaches the problem directly and permits the 
courts to refuse to enforce all or any part of a contract which 
they find to be unconscionable as a matter of law, without any 
necessity of manipulating contract rules or public policy. Sec­
tion 87A-2-302 of the U.C.C. as adopted by Montana, states:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any 
clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the 
time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the con­
tract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract with­
out the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the appli­
cation of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any uncon­
scionable result.
The question of whether a contract is unconscionable is one of 
degree to be answered by the court upon hearing all the evi­
dence. It is a question of whether the agreement was “so one­
sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing 
at the time of the making of the contract.”43 In one case, for 
example, it was held that a clause limiting the time during 
which complaints could be made was inapplicable to latent 
defects in a shipment of catsup which could only be discovered 
by microscopic analysis.44 It seems reasonable to conclude that 
it will be easier under this new law for a defendant to make a 
showing of unconscionability and obtain relief now that the 
U.C.C. has made it easier for the court to implement the intent 
of the law rather than having to enforce a contract to the letter.
“Um/orm Commercial Code, 1962 Official Text, Section 2-301, Com-
y X •
T i t ™  Pac. Z d f m l  a903C7)ry C°' Packin9 CorP- 93 Utah
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“Consignment” or “Sale or Return”
The Montana businessmen who have relied upon the con­
signment to shield goods from the creditors of an agent to 
whom they were delivered for sale to third parties should be 
advised that the U.C.C. has changed the law. Prior to the U.C.C. 
a businessman, as consignor, who wanted an outlet for the sale 
of his goods could consign them to the party who operated the 
outlet, as consignee, making said consignee his agent for sale 
of the goods to third parties. As there was no sale to the con­
signee he acquired no title to the goods and consequently the 
goods could not be reached by the consignee’s creditors nor 
transferred to his trustee in bankruptcy. In addition, because 
the consignor retained title to the goods he could exercise cer­
tain controls over their sale to third persons, and consignee 
dealers were not forced to bear the risk of finding a market or 
the expense of purchasing the stock of goods. The principal 
question raised in connection with this type of transaction was 
whether it was in fact a consignment creating an agency or a 
sale vesting title to the goods in the consignee so that they were 
subject to the claims of his creditors. As long ago as 1917 the 
Montana Supreme Court stated:
If the contract provides that the consignee shall pay for all 
the goods delivered to him, whether they are sold and delivered
to the customers or not . . . the transaction is a sale___ On the
other hand, if the title to the goods remains in the consignor, 
and undelivered goods are to be returned to it, the transaction 
is one of agency, even though the consignee may be held re­
sponsible for the payment of the purchase price of the goods 
delivered to customers. (State v. Tuffs, 54 Mont. 20, 25, 165 Pac 
1107.)
Thus, if the goods could be returned to the consignor he was
the principal of the agent consignee and retained title to the
goods which could not be reached by the creditors of the con­
signee.
Under the U.C.C., however, though the consignment remains 
effective as between the consignor and consignee, the creditors 
of the consignee may acquire an interest in the goods superior 
to that of the consignor despite the consignment. Section 87A-2- 
326 (3) of the U.C.C. as adopted by Montana provides:
Where goods are delivered to a person for sale and such per­
son maintains a place of business at which he deals in goods of 
the kind involved, under a name other than the name of the 
person making delivery, then with respect to claims of creditors 
of the person conducting the business the goods are deemed to
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be on sale or return. The provisions of this subsection are ap­
plicable even though an agreement purports to reserve title to 
the person making delivery until payment or resale or uses 
such words as “on consignment” or “on memorandum.” How­
ever, this subsection is not applicable if the person making de­
livery
(a) complies with an applicable law providing for a consignor’s 
interest or the like to be evidenced by a sign, or
(b) establishes that the person conducting the business is gen­
erally known by his creditors to be substantially engaged 
in selling the goods of others, or
(c) complies with the filing provisions of the Chapter on Se­
cured Transactions (Chapter 9). (Emphasis supplied.)
By deeming the goods to be “on sale or return” this section 
makes goods delivered “on consignment” subject to the claims 
of the creditors of the consignee to whom they are delivered, 
for Section 87A-2-326 (2) states that “goods held on sale or re­
turn are subject to such claims while in the buyer’s (con­
signee’s) possession.” The only way the consignor may avoid 
subjecting the goods to attachment or levy by the creditors of 
the consignee is by complying with alternative (a), (b) or (c) 
quoted as part of the subsection above, any one of which makes 
the subsection inapplicable. Alternative (a) is not available to 
Montana businessmen as this state has no “sign posting” law, 
and alternative (b), that of proving that the consignee was 
“generally known by his creditors to be substantially engaged 
in selling the goods of others” would be burdensome at best as 
it would require the consignor to bear the burden of proof of 
this fact. The only one of these three alternatives which is 
reasonably available to a Montana businessman is (c) which 
requires compliance with the filing provisions of the Chapter 
on Secured Transactions (Chapter 9).
Thus the U.C.C. has elevated the consignment intended as 
security to a “Security Agreement” to be governed by Chapter 
9,45 and the filing of a financing statement in compliance with 
the provisions of that Chapter is the only reasonable means of 
shielding the consigned goods from the creditors of the con­
signee. This change has been made as a result of a growing 
antipathy toward secret liens and because the common law con­
signment violated the principle of ostensible ownership; that 
is, those who extend credit to the consignee should be able to 
presume that property in his possession is his unless the inter­
ests of others are a matter of public record or the creditor is
“Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, Section 87A-9-102 (2).
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advised to the contrary. It was the intent of those who drafted 
the U.C.C. to see to it that the general creditors of consignees 
did not rely on what appeared to be the consignee’s property 
as a basis for the extension of credit. The Uniform Commercial 
Code, 1962 Official Text, Section 2-326, Comment 2 states:
Pursuant to the general policies of this Act which require 
good faith not only between the parties to the sales contract, but 
as against interested third parties, subsection (3) resolves all 
reasonable doubts as to the nature of the transaction in favor 
of the general creditors of the buyer. As against such creditors, 
words such as ‘on consignment1 or ‘on memorandum,’ are dis­
regarded when the buyer has a place of business at which he 
deals in goods of the kind involved.
It should be noted, however, that the consigned goods are not 
subject to claims of the consignee’s creditors if the consignee 
operates his place of business in the name of the consignor. 
This is because creditors would not be apt to rely upon the con­
signee s apparent ownership of goods in his possession under 
these circumstances.
The Statute of Limitations
Every state imposes certain limitations on the time within 
which a civil action may be brought, in order to bar stale 
claims. Witnesses move away or die, records are destroyed or 
misplaced, memories fade and the passage of time generally 
erodes the possibility of proving facts and circumstances. For 
this reason, and because it would be unreasonable to place de­
fendants under constant and continuous jeopardy from civil 
actions, there is a strong public policy in favor of forcing parties 
to diligently pursue their remedies. Under the prior law in 
Montana any legal action based on an instrument in writing 
had to be commenced within eight years.40 If the action thereon 
were not commenced within that time the plaintiff was barred 
from recovery. If it was an action based upon a contract, ac­
count, or promise not founded on an instrument in writing, the 
legal proceedings had to be initiated within five years,47 and if 
fraud or mistake were the basis of the action it had to be 
brought within two years.48
The U.C.C. both continues and strengthens the public policy *4
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in favor of barring stale claims. Section 87A-2-725 of the U.C.C. 
as adopted by Montana states:
(1) An action for breach of any contract for sale must be com­
menced within f o u r  y e a r s  after the cause of action has 
accrued. By the original agreement the parties may reduce 
the period of limitation to not less than one year but may 
not extend it. (Emphasis supplied.)
It should be noted that this section applies only to contracts for 
sale and that it makes no distinction beween actions which are 
or are not based upon a written agreement. Therefore actions 
based on both oral and written contracts of sale must now be 
brought within four years in Montana. This shortening of the 
period of limitation from that which previously prevailed in 
most states is explained in the comment to the appropriate sec­
tion in the 1962 Official Text of the U.C.C. as follows:
This Article takes sales contracts out of the general laws lim it­
ing the time for commencing contractual actions and selects a 
four-year period as the most appropriate to modern business 
practice. This is within the normal commercial record keep­
ing period. ( .U n i fo r m  C o m m e r c i a l  C o d e ,  1962 Official Text, Sec- 
tion 2-725, Comment.)
Under this section Montana businessmen may achieve a finality 
of commercial transactions within four years and need not re­
tain records for a longer period for the purpose of defending 
themselves against older claims. It should also be noted that 
the parties to a sales contract are given some latitude in de­
termining the period of limitation for themselves. They may 
reduce the period of limitation to not less than one year but 
may not extend it.”
Conclusion
It should be remembered that the discussion herein is limited 
to a portion of Chapter 2 of the U.C.C. and that the principles 
mentioned apply only to sales of goods. The reader should, 
therefore, carefully distinguish other contracts to which these 
principles mentioned do not apply. It should also be remem­
bered that this article is neither designed nor intended to take 
the place of legal counsel with respect to particular problems.
iscussion of many qualifications and exceptions to various 
sections of Chapter 2 might well be found by the reader’s own 
counsel to apply to any given problem. We can only hope that 
this article will facilitate recognition of policies and practices 
which should be changed by calling to the reader’s attention 
some of the more outstanding updating in the law caused by 
the enactment of the U.C.C. in Montana.
W hat Price Progress?
NORMAN E. TAYLOR 
Associate Director
Bureau of Business and Economic Research 
University of Montana, Missoula
In the last issue of the Montana Business Quarterly, the arti­
cle entitled, Living With Change” described some aspects of 
our present society and its complexity. We looked at the reasons 
for change, the organizing of research, the array of remark- 
able. new products, the pervasiveness of innovation, and the 
significance of change for the individual. It would be accurate
to conclude from that discussion that “Living IS Change”_
whether we view it in biological, economic, social or other 
terms. Rather than shrinking, our world is getting larger—from 
the ocean depths to distant planets—our minds and our horizons 
are being stretched.
In the economic history of Europe and North America there 
are names of key innovators to remember: John Kay and his 
Flying Shuttle, James Hargreaves and his “Spinning Jenny,” 
Oliver Evans, Eli Whitney, Robert Fulton and Howard Aiken 
(inventor of the Mark I, the first true computer). We forget 
the unidentified and vastly more numerous thousands of people 
who resisted each new technological process—who attacked 
inventors and damaged factories because they feared displace­
ment by a machine. These people had not learned the one in­
controvertible lesson that history teaches us: that, while the 
nature of work may be changed, innovation ultimately in­
creases the total number of jobs to be filled.
General Charles de Gaulle said in a recent speech in Mexico 
that “the world is undergoing a transformation to which no 
change that has yet occurred can be compared, either in scope 
or in rapidity.” An editorial in Life magazine entitled “Nine 
Jobs in Your Future” argues for continuing education and the 
updating of labor skills so that American workers can remain
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employable in the face of rapid technological change.1 A cen­
tury ago a man could learn a trade and retire from the same 
occupation; by contrast today, a worker might easily be forced 
to engage in many occupations (even within a single company) 
before retirement. For example, a graduate engineer has “a 
half life of about ten years. Half of what he now knows will be 
obsolete in ten years. Half of what he will need to know ten 
years hence is not available today.”2
The magnitude of changes that we can expect in the realm 
of new ideas, processes, and products is awesome; but even in 
such pedestrian areas as city and residential growth our needs 
are enormous. As President Johnson stated in his “Great So­
ciety” speech last year: “In the remainder of this century, 
urban populations will double, city land will double and we will 
have to build homes, highways and facilities equal to all those 
built since this country was settled. In the next forty years we 
must rebuild the entire urban United States!”
Furthermore, the human animal is progressively changing. 
A leading advertising executive says: “People are taller than 
they used to be. And healthier. And richer. And better edu­
cated. And more sophisticated. With more varied appetites. 
With more cultivated tastes. With longer weekends. And wider 
interests. And more hobbies. People are growing up faster. And 
staying young longer. They are becoming harder to satisfy. 
Harder to fool. Easier to bore.”8 Hundreds of new products to 
please these “new” people appear every day. But it is argued 
that there are already available too many products, at too many 
prices, sizes and qualities, yet with not enough reliable infor­
mation for rational choices. Many of the people holding this 
view are also champions of the free enterprise system who 
would resist any attempt by governments to control or tamper 
with a firm’s right to decide these matters for itself. And yet 
they fail to recognize that private business initiative has been
the source of most of the innovation and complexity to which 
they object.
Another facet to the consumer’s problem of choice is that 
most of the products and services that we consume today are 
not necessities of life. If all that we really need for survival are
’Ibid < Nine J°bS ^  Y° Ur Future’” Vo1- 58> No- n > March 19, 1965, p. 4.
B i1: ®obbs’ “What a Mess We’ve Made of Mother,” a speech given at 
|ctoberM19gai 959S Seminar’ Metropolitan Club, New York City,
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a cave, a bearskin, and a club, anything else, then, is a luxury. 
Most distinctions between necessities and luxuries are neither 
meaningful nor consistent. They usually amount to little more 
than saying “what I purchase is a necessity; everything else is 
a luxury.” And many of us would “rather fight than switch” 
to necessities alone. Who, then, is to determine what is too 
much variety?
Until fairly recently in our business history, it was possible 
for a firm to survive merely by modest aggressiveness in dispos­
ing of staple goods inventories. Today, marketing research pre­
cedes production activities and strongly influences product de­
sign. Executives are hard-pressed to discern and anticipate what 
consumers really want (not merely what they say they want) 
in time to manufacture and distribute the item before competi­
tors skim the same market. Retailers must choose the limited 
number of products that can be accommodated on their shelves 
from among thousands of alternatives. Yet new products con­
tinue to appear. Nobody clamored for shirts or pants that do not 
need ironing, for an electric carving knife, or for orbiting satel­
lites that would relay TV signals and permit us to watch the 
Olympic games as the events took place.
Hence, the primary function of many marketers is to create 
demand and not merely to satisfy it. Once the laboratory has 
developed the new product it must be sold. The least expensive 
way to reach large audiences is through advertising. But, in 
creating demand for these new products and services, adver­
tising too often has become a Frankenstein’s monster which has 
resulted in much that is picayune and offensive. Admittedly, 
the seller s task is a difficult one when there are no real prod- 
uct superiorities or when a product has limited utility. Witness 
the niggling claims associated with efforts to make the Ameri­
can consumer desire striped toothpaste or four headlights for 
his automobile. Should not a manufacturer be at least slightly 
embarrassed at presentations which insult consumers of even 
average intelligence? When I read a bold advertising headline 
which asserts that some company has taken eight years and 
spent four million dollars to improve (slightly) the closure de­
vice on its beer can my reaction is: “Why would they ever ad­
mit it?”
Change, new products, and advertising can all be carried to 
fantastic and meaningless lengths. Do Americans really need a 
chrome and silver beer can disposal for picnic use which oper­
ates like a mortar and can fire an empty beer can 100 feet into J
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the bushes? A 1964 Christmas best seller of San Francisco’s 
Gumps’ store was a “fondling piece” in a suede pouch, for 
nervous executives made of (to use their phrase) “otherwise 
useless” hunks of jade ($8.25). “Executives could also give and 
get desk-scale Rolls’ Royce radiators, fused into everything 
from paperweights to cigar lighters to book ends.”4 In recent 
years the Nieman-Marcus store in Dallas has offered “His & 
Her” jeeps and airplanes and a solid gold bone “for the dog 
that has everything.” The American Cyanamid Company is 
predicting $500 million a year sales of an improved garbage bag. 
There is even a church in Florida which seems to have been 
swept along with the tide of merchandising gimmicks: it offers 
green trading stamps to the people who attend Sunday and 
mid-week services.5
One of the questionable by-products of mass merchandising 
efforts is the creation of unintentional values on which oppor­
tunists may capitalize. Poking fun at the $10 million Bristol- 
Myers Vitalis campaign, two college students struck it rich by 
marketing “Greasy Kid Stuff.” Brand X cigarettes (“The ciga­
rette that always come in second—it costs a little more but 
remember, it promises a little less”) which started as a spoof 
found a surprising market demand.
How many of us have a negative reaction to advertisers that 
admonish us not to be “half-safe” or to those who rant end­
lessly about the virtues of a pill for an ailment for which medi­
cal science has found no cure? Appeals such as “There are cer­
tain talents to owning an Imperial,” or “The man who thinks 
for himself smokes Viceroys,” do not move me either to buy 
or to have a favorable attitude toward the seller. Who is not 
offended by this caption: “For the first time in your life feel 
really clean”? There is the Wisconsin television dealer who, 
in his eagerness to sell a used TV set, represented it as being 
in excellent condition “because it had been owned by a little 
old lady with weak eyes.” This type of classic irrelevance hope­
fully will disappear.
It has been estimated that Madison Avenue presents 1500 
advertising messages daily to the average U. S. consumer; no 
wonder we sometimes are confused and frustrated. In the 
welter of ideas screaming for notice, it is easy to see how copy
'T im e , “The Business of Giving,” Vol. 84, No. 23, December 4, 1964, dd 
100- 102.
"S a tu r d a y  R e v i e w ,  “All God’s Chillun Got Stamps,” Vol. XLIV, No. 38 
September 23, 1961, p. 7.
writers and others in the industry might be tempted to employ 
questionable logic or techniques if only they have attention 
value. Fortunately, not all advertising people are content with 
the state of their craft. Here is part of a speech by Whit Hobbs 
of Batten, Barton, Durstine & Osborn, Inc. that indicates Madi­
son Avenue can get more annoyed even than many of the con­
sumers it is trying to reach.
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A housewife in a supermarket is a lonely girl; there’s no 
friendly grocer at her elbow to help her. There are 5,000 items 
on the shelves. And last year, 6,000 n e w  items were intro­
duced to her. That’s 20 new products every single shopping 
day. This is a real confused character, and she needs help. Con­
sider for a moment the state of her crowded mind as she lugs 
through the crowded aisles. She is worried about her tired 
blood, and the laxative habit, and denture breath, and lower- 
back pains, and clogged sinuses, and rough, red hands. Her 
hair is dull, her pores are large, her skin is dry, her scalp is 
itchy. Her stomach valve keeps letting out more A’s than B’s 
and her stomach acid keeps burning holes in her handkerchief. 
She’s never felt really clean before, and even now she only 
feels half safe. Worst of all, it turns out that her bra isn’t a 
liv in g  bra; for some reason, it just lies there. Advertising did 
all this . . . what a mess we’ve made of Mother. Isn’t it time we 
stopped yelling at her and nagging her and confusing her and 
talking down to her and boring her? . . .
. . . Let’s stop doing ads in which ecstatic housewives sm e ll  
their towels. And lie down, apparently cold sober, and ro ll  
th e m se lv e s  u p  in their luxurious new livingroom rug. And 
caress their 2-ply double soft, double strength, facial quality 
negligee-colored to ile t  p a p e r . Let’s treat toilet paper like 
nothing more nor less than what it is; toilet paper. .
. . . Let s have the breakfast scenes in which everyone isn’t so 
goddam cheerful. And the refrigerator isn’t neatly packed with 
$700 worth of beautifully glazed hams and picture book parfaits 
and impossibly high cakes—and not a leftover in sight. .
. . . Let s find children who ta lk  like children—and say things 
that children say, instead of ‘Gosh all jiminy, nice Mommy 
this cough syrup tastes as good as the syrup you put on icey 
cream.’ . . §
. . .  Can’t we, in the next ten years, get all the nasty little weasels 
out of our ads? And the men in the white coats trying to pass 
for doctors. Can’t we stop opening and closing all those miser­
able trapdoors? And sloshing around in clogged, throbbing 
sinus passages? Can’t we get out of biology and back into adver­
tising?6
As adman David Ogilvy has observed, “The consumer is no 
moron. She is your wife.”
Hobbs, op. cit.
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Most of us would not hesitate to affirm the sentiments ex­
pressed above. Even so, the instructions given out by adver­
tisers and their agencies make it a minor miracle that any 
program or commercial is ever aired, even the atrocious ones. 
A leading magazine reports the problem thus:
Testifying before the FCC, the elders of the advertising pro­
fession reported on the infinitely detailed sponsor’s command­
ments that govern TV’s script carpenters. Samples:
McCann-Erickson for Liggett & Myers (Chesterfields, L & 
M’s): no portrayal of pipe or cigar smoking or chewing. . . . 
While w e do not want to create an impression of one continual, 
sm oke-filled room, from time to time in the shows w e feel 
‘natural* smoking action is a requisite by the cast. We don’t 
want public criticism in encouraging the too young or ‘too young 
looking’ to smoke. On the other hand, the high school and col­
lege market is extrem ely important to Liggett & Myers as fu­
ture long-tim e customers. . . .
• : • Dancer-Fitzgerald-Sam ple for General Mills (W heaties,
Kix, Cheerios): There w ill be no material that m ay give of­
fense, either directly or by inference, to any organized minor­
ity group, or section of the country, or a commercial organiza­
tion of any sort. This w ill be taken to include political organi­
zations; fraternal organizations; college and school groups; 
labor groups, religious orders; civic clubs, memorial and patri­
otic societies; philanthropic and reform societies (Anti-Tobacco 
League, for exam ple); athletic organizations; wom en’s groups, 
etc. . . . Where it seems fitting the characters should reflect 
recognition and acceptance of the world situation in their 
thoughts and actions, although in dealing w ith war, our writers 
should minimize the ‘horror’ aspects. . . . References to other 
cowboy stars should not be used. . . . References should not be 
made to ‘com petitive’ horses such as ‘Trigger,’ ‘Silver,’ e t  a l.
Not included in the FCC testimony was this directive issued by 
the Prate, Preen and Blough Agency for B lastw ell Inc., a sm all- 
arms manufacturer:
Competitive methods of ‘death’ dealing, such as head-bashing, 
ax-hacking, plank-walking or feeding to soldier ants are pro­
hibited on our private-eye show, J o h n n y  C o n tu s io n .  Not all 
actors need be armed, but where it seems ‘natural,’ B lastw ell 
pistols should be worn. It is absolutely essential that all pistol 
shots hit their targets. ‘Death’ should be sw ift and sure, but 
on the other hand there should be no shots of m essy or dis­
satisfied-looking ‘corpses.’ Children under six  should show a 
natural interest in Blastwell firearms, but should not be a l­
lowed to fire a gun, except in special circumstances.7
The bases for such restrictive directives are fairly obvious. 
However, a recent incident of “rigged research” underlines
Time, “1,000 Times No,” Vol. 76, No. 19, Nov. 7, 1960, pp. 87-88.
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the vulnerability of an agency, and gives a new reason for 
exercising caution. The discovery that a physician had fabri­
cated some research results led to the conviction of the manu­
facturing firm and its president for criminal attempt to defraud 
the public through false and misleading advertising. What is 
novel in this bit of litigation is that the advertising agency 
which handled the Regimen account itself was found guilty of 
similar criminal charges and was fined $50,000 . . . “The first 
time, according to lawyers, that an agency has been legally 
punished for advertising the claims of its client.”8
It is too early to tell what this augurs for consumers; but, if 
similar prosecutions follow, it may be that our confidence in 
advertising claims can be partially restored. Who knows, pos­
sibly even a laundry soap manufacturer may join Avis and 
Vice President Humphrey in claiming the “No. 2 spot,” instead 
of insisting along with dozens of other producers that it alone 
makes clothes “cleanest, whitest and brightest.”
The foregoing discussion calls to mind the popular expres­
sion “it takes two to tango.” To the extent that consumers are 
not discriminating, whether through laziness, ignorance, or in­
competence, products of questionable utility will continue to 
be sold. The failure of consumers to exercise their veto power 
by not purchasing invites continued exploitation. And the same 
holds for bad advertising; the purchase of products so pro­
moted, encourages more inanities. Before appreciable change 
for the better is likely to develop in the types of products of­
fered and in the promotional effort supporting them, entre­
preneurs must be convinced that shoddy merchandise and 
highly emotional buying motives have no market appeal. One 
would hope that both parties might in the future improve their 
standards of choice and behavior. We should not encourage 
waste, tastelessness, and extravagance simply because we can 
afford them.
If space permitted we might elaborate on other aspects of 
the merchant-consumer relationship which could be improved. 
A few years ago we heard much about “rigged TV shows” and 
“payola scandals.” Recently we have been hearing about hid­
den interest charges, slack fill, inadequate testing of powerful 
drugs, misrepresentation in TV commercials, bait advertising, 
fictitious pricing, and so on. Does this mean that merchants 
today are less ethical or moral than they were? Not at all. The
sFrom a news story in T he W all S tre e t Journal, June 30, 1965, p. 12.
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truth is that business practice is of a higher standard than ever 
before; what is changing even more quickly, though, is the con­
sumer. Although today’s average consumer is smarter than 
ever before, she has not yet learned to discriminate—she does 
not yet appreciate her potential power. The practices that con­
sumers object to will be changed. Exceptionally perceptive 
business executives observe that more and more customers are 
refusing to buy poorly manufactured goods and unwanted 
services. Spenders want to deal with reliable firms; they will 
patronize sellers who can offer genuine values and avoid those 
who cannot. Enlightened business organizations are becoming 
deeply involved, as they should be, in values that are more 
important than simple material rewards.
We have seen that change is ubiquitous, inevitable, and ac­
celerating. In science and technology, in education and busi­
ness practices, in broad economic, political and demographic 
terms, innovation is a circumstance of 20th century life that 
cannot be ignored. Our attitudes and values are variable and 
even our language is subject to alteration from many stimuli.
,r those who are inclined to fear or resent change, there are 
stul many areas wherein improvement is still possible. The 
difficulties of adjustment to new situations may be less than 
those associated with living with the present plight.
, *n the area of business-consumer relationships that we have 
been discussing there is much that can yet be done to lessen 
riction and frustrations. Singly, or in groups, consumers must 
help manufacturers and retailers to become better informed 
regarding buyers’ attitudes toward advertising and products, 
sellers must become convinced that the questionable activities 
cited are not good business. When this occurs, a new dignity 
and mutual trust will be possible in our trading relationships.
The Business Outlook
MAXINE C. JOHNSON 
Assistant Director
Bureau of Business and Economic Research 
University of Montana, Missoula
The Nation
As the summer draws to a close, the United States economy 
continues to boom along, under the heady influence of the 
longest business expansion in the nation’s peacetime history. 
July marked the 53rd straight month of economic expansion 
and most businessmen were far too busy to worry much about 
suggestions of possible trouble spots. Personal incomes con­
tinued to increase; and unemployment, at 4.7 percent of the 
labor force in June, was the lowest in eight years, although 
still higher than most people would like to see it.
In truth, remarkably few problems threaten the U.S. econ­
omy at the moment, although more may develop in 1966. And, 
in these few areas, many economists feel that if government 
and business, labor and the public in general continue to exer­
cise the good judgment and restraint which they have exhibited 
during the past few years, the present expansion can continue.
The greatest uncertainties seem to exist on the international 
scene, where monetary problems and the military situation in 
Asia continue to plague policymakers. The U.S. balance of pay­
ments is approaching an equilibrium, but international mone­
tary reform moves appear to be stymied. The most realistic 
assumption with respect to Vietnam appears to be that the 
United States will continue to expand its role in the war and 
that defense spending will increase.
Here at home opinions differ as to whether inflation is a 
major threat, or whether the expansion is likely to run out of 
gas. Prices have been remarkably stable during recent years 
and unless current wage negotiations should produce exces­
sive wage increases (out of line with productivity gains), most
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observers see little threat of inflation. The likelihood of a slow­
down in the rate of expansion seems somewhat greater. During 
the latter part of this year, increased social security payments 
and excise tax reductions will provide more consumer purchas­
ing power. However, beginning in January 1966, increased 
social security taxes will take an additional $5 billion per year 
from the pockets of employers and businessmen, thus eliminat­
ing that amount of potential purchasing power. The federal 
budget currently is swinging from a deficit to a surplus on a 
cash basis, providing a further deflationary effect (Vietnam 
developments conceivably could change this). Should total 
business and consumer spending show signs of faltering, how­
ever, there is little doubt that the federal government will move 
quickly toward a more expansionary fiscal policy, either by 
cutting income taxes again, to prevent the government from 
pulling too much money out of the economy, or by other 
measures.
While these and other possible trouble spots were being de­
bated by economists, preliminary estimates of the economy’s 
performance during the second quarter interjected a cheerful 
note. Instead of the $6 billion to $7 billion increase in gross 
national product predicted, 2nd quarter GNP was $9.2 billion 
above the first quarter of 1965. Estimated at $658 billion (an­
nual rate), this growth reflected increases in spending by con­
sumers and government and in the surplus of exports over im­
ports. Businesses, after stockpiling steel in the first quarter, 
added to their inventories at a slower rate during April-June, 
but the rate of investment in plant and equipment combined 
was a little higher. Spending for residential construction—of 
interest to Montanans— increased only slightly and housing 
activity was described as “sluggish.”
Although the $9.2 billion total increase in GNP was sub­
stantially smaller than the unusual $14.4 billion advance be­
tween the fourth quarter of 1964 and the first quarter 1965, it 
was large enough to lend credence to the widely held belief that 
the present expansion is far from over. The rate of growth may 
slow down, but business over the U.S. as a whole could con­
tinue to get better for some time to come..
The State
In Montana, 1965 probably will be the best year since 1962. 
In both 1963 and 1964, reduced farm income and limited growth
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in nonagricultural employment prevented the state from shar­
ing in the national growth which has been taking place. Total 
personal income remained stable at approximately $1.5 billion 
between 1962 and 1964, and total employment has shown little 
change since 1963. This year, however, agricultural prospects 
are brighter, with the crop outlook excellent at midyear and 
with cattle prices considerably higher than a year ago. Esti­
mates by the Unemployment Compensation Commission indi­
cate that nonagricultural employment is increasing moder­
ately thanks to growing numbers of workers in construction, 
retail trade, and state and local government. The outlook for 
jobs during the remainder of the year is good. Unemployment 
is low, approximately 4.3 percent of the labor force is without 
work. It should be noted that unemployment remains low be­
cause many job-seekers move out of the state to look for work, 
rather than because of any significant increase in employment 
opportunities.
Unless unfavorable weather developments affect what now 
promises to be an unusually good wheat crop, personal income 
in Montana should increase this year and the state should begin 
1966 in the best economic condition in several years. Neverthe­
less, we have a long way to go before we approach the growth 
records now being set by the United States economy.
Myths and Misconceptions About 
Montana's State and Local Taxes
JOHN H. WICKS
Assistant Professor of Economics
University of Montana, Missoula
As a topic of conversation in Montana, nothing beats increases 
in the amount of state and local taxation. While it is not a pop­
ular fact, there has been an almost fourfold increase in the 
number of dollars of taxes collected by the state of Montana 
and by local governmental units—such as counties and cities— 
in the 17 years following World War II.
However, consideration only of actual dollar figures during 
this period of time can produce distorted results. This distor­
tion is caused by leaving out certain other factors—namely the 
general price level, population, and income—in making such a 
comparison. This article should help to show how yearly Mon­
tana tax collections since 1946-47 can take these factors into 
account to obtain a more meaningful view of what really has 
been happening to the level of taxation.
Since the 1946-47 fiscal year, taxes levied by the state gov­
ernment have gone up in every year except 1952-53. Taxes in 
1963-64 were 396 percent of 1946-47 taxes. The top line in Fig­
ure 1 compares the state tax collections in each year since 1946- 
47 to that base year. The top line in Figure 2 shows the same 
information for state plus local taxes. The reader can see that 
the two lines are very similar.
However, during this same 17-year period the general price 
level increased by nearly 50 percent. Specifically, the goods 
purchased by the typical consumer cost 47.7 percent more in 
1963-64 than they did in 1946-47. This is the same as saying that 
each dollar of tax collected in 1963-64 had purchasing power of 
only about 67.7 percent as much as a dollar of tax collected in 
the base period. Since the general price level has increased dur­
ing almost every year since 1946, the purchasing power of the
taxes collected has become progressively less per dollar of 
taxes.
The taxpayer’s actual burden can be measured by the reduc­
tion of his purchasing power. Thus, to compare the total burden 
of taxes collected in different years, it is necessary to compare 
the lost purchasing power rather than the simple dollar 
amounts. The purchasing power for each year can be computed 
by dividing the amount of taxes collected by the consumer
FIGURE 1 
(1946*47 — 100)
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^ °y /ce: biennial Reports, Montana State Board of Equalization, Helena, 
Montana.
price index, which is a mathematical measure of the average 
cost of living computed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
The second line from the top in Figures 1 and 2 compares the 
purchasing power of the taxes collected in each year since 1946- 
47 with that base year. These lines show that although there is 
considerable increase in the taxes expressed in purchasing
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power terms, the amount of increase is much less than for the 
taxes expressed in dollar terms.
Since it is people who ultimately pay all taxes, the degree of 
lost purchasing power depends upon the number of people 
over which the tax is spread. Probably the best way to take 
this factor into account is to express the burden on a per capita 
basis. Per capita burden is computed by dividing the purchas­
ing power of taxes collected by Montana population for each 
year. The solid lines in Figures 1 and 2 compare the per capita 
purchasing power of taxes in each year with the 1946-47 base
FIGURE 2 
(iaifj-17— loo)
year. On this basis, the comparative burden of taxation has just 
slightly more than doubled since World War II, instead of in­
creasing fourfold as the dollar increase implies.
The actual burden borne by taxpayers in a state may also be 
measured by computing the percentage of personal income paid
48 M O N T A N A  B U S I N E S S  Q U A R T E R L Y
in taxes. Personal income is the sum of all net income received 
by individuals—out of which they can spend, save, and pay 
taxes. Thus, the portion of income devoted to taxes can be 
measured in terms of the individual’s resources with which to 
pay them. The dotted lines in Figures 1 and 2 compare the 
portion of income devoted to taxation in each year to the por- 
tion used for taxes in the 1946-47 base year. The pattern is very 
similar to the pattern of the per capita purchasing power of 
taxes. The tax burden, when measured as a percentage of in­
come, has increased by about 90 percent since 1946-47, as op­
posed to the nearly 300 percent that gross tax collections have 
increased.
It is not the purpose of this article to discuss the desirability 
or undesirability of a 90 percent increase, or whether such an 
increase is as large as it sounds. Higher standards of govern­
mental services and an expansion of such activities as law en­
forcement, superhighways, and higher education simply cost 
more. Whether such factors are worthwhile or not is left to the 
reader. However, both costs and values become more meaning- 
u when one keeps in mind how many dollars of an increase in 
tax collections represent an actual growth in the level of gov­
ernmental operations, and how many dollars simply reflect an 
increase in prices and population.
W hat’s Happening in Retail Trade?
MAXINE C. JOHNSON 
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Like the family farm, small business has long been one of the 
most sacrosanct of American institutions. Small businesses do 
make an important contribution to the national economy; and 
in Montana, with its small communities and sparse population, 
they occupy a particularly significant place, especially that 
large group of firms engaged in retail trade. Commerce—par­
ticularly retailing—is the major function of many Montana 
cities and towns, and together with the farmer and rancher, re­
tail merchants rank as leading employers in the state. But, like 
the farmer and the rancher, retailers are in the midst of a pe­
riod of change which promises to create a very different in­
dustry pattern in the future.
The Over-all Picture
In 1963, the total sales of 7,797 retail establishments in Mon­
tana amounted to $965,734,000. These firms provided employ­
ment for approximately 32,500 wage and salary workers and 
7,195 proprietors, or owners (Table 1). All of these figures 
except the employment estimate come from the 1963 Census 
of Business1 and, when compared to data from earlier censuses 
taken in 1954 and 1958, they confirm some of the changes which 
have been occurring in recent years.
For example, the number of retail stores is declining. There 
were over 400 (5 percent) fewer retail businesses in 1963 than 
there were in either 1954 or 1958. Total sales, on the other hand,
TJ. S. Bureau of the Census, C e n s u s  o f  B u s in e s s ,  1963, R e t a i l  T r a d e :  
M o n ta n a ,  BC 63-RA 28, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washing­
ton, D. C., 1964.
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are increasing. They amounted to approximately $966 million 
in 1963—an increase of 24 percent over 1954 and 12 percent over 
1958. Of course, part of this increase was a reflection of higher 
prices rather than an increase in the physical amount of goods 
sold. If we take rising prices into account and convert total 
sales to constant, 1954 dollars (also given in Table 1), the in­
creases were considerably smaller. But whether comparisons 
are made in terms of current dollars or deflated dollars, Mon­
tana’s increase in retail sales has been considerably smaller 
than the growth reported by retailers in the country as a whole.
Yearly figures from the Unemployment Compensation Com­
mission of Montana indicate there were approximately 7 per­
cent more wage and salary workers employed in the state’s 
retail outlets in 1963 than in 1954.2 During the same years, the 
number of persons employed by retail stores throughout the 
nation increased 16 percent.3 In both Montana and the United 
States, average annual sales per employee appear to have been 
around $30,000.
The loss of 400 retail stores in Montana probably occurred 
chiefly among the smaller stores. Nevertheless, most retail out­
lets in Montana still are very small businesses, at least in terms 
of number of employees. During the first quarter of 1962, 57 
percent of Montana retail firms reporting to the Social Security 
Administration had between one and four employees and 82 
percent employed from one to eight workers.4 These figures 
do not include small family-operated firms with no paid em­
ployees, and there are a good many of these. Although their 
numbers are declining and although their share of the market 
may be getting smaller, it obviously will be some time before 
small businesses are extinct in Montana.
Perhaps the most interesting changes revealed by the Census 
reports are the changes taking place in the geographic pattern 
of retail activity and the very different rates of growth or de­
cline in various kinds of businesses. Given the state’s recent his-
“Census of Business figures for mid-November of Census years do not 
necessarily give an accurate picture of changes in year-round employ­
ment.
8M an pow er R ep o r t o f th e  P res id e n t an d  A  R ep o r t on M a n p o w er R e ­
qu irem en ts , R esou rces, U tiliza tio n , a n d  T ra in in g  b y  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  
D ep a rtm en t o f L a b o r , transmitted to the Congress March 1964, U. S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 1964.
4U. S. Bureau of the Census, C ou n ty  B u sin ess P a tte rn s , First Quarter 
1962, Part 9, Mountain States, U. S. Government Printing Office, Wash­
ington, D. C., 1963.
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tory of limited growth in population and income, there was no 
reason to anticipate anything other than modest gains in total 
retail sales and employment. And the most casual observer has 
been aware that the growth has been taking place in the larger 
urban centers. As the urban population of Montana has grown, 
new retail facilities have appeared in the larger towns and 
cities. On the other hand, the hometown seed and feed, the fam­
ily drugstore, the hardware or mercantile store in rural areas 
is suffering from a lack of customers. The trend toward con­
solidation of farm and ranch units and the movement of rural 
families to the cities has produced many empty store windows 
on many small town main streets.
The growth disparity in kinds of businesses shows up clearly 
when we see that although there were 426 fewer retail outlets 
of all types in the state in 1963 than in 1954, there were 141 (15
TABLE 2
RETAIL ESTABLISHMENTS IN MONTANA, 1954, 1958, AND 1963
Source: U. S. Bureau of the Census, C e n s u s  o f  B u s in e s s ,  1963 , R e t a i l  
T r a d e :  M o n ta n a ,  BC63-RA28, U. S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D. C., 1964 and C e n s u s  o f  B u s in e s s ,  1958 , R e t a i l  T r a d e :  
M o n t a n a , BC58-RA26, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 
D. C., 1960.
percent) more gasoline stations to service the growing numbers 
of automobiles. There were also 139 (15 percent) more eating 
places, in the face of a very modest increase in sales by those
P ercent Change
„  . 1954- 1958-
Kmd of B usiness 1954 1958 1963 1963 1963
Total number of establishments 8,223 8,261 7,797   5   6
Lumber, building materials, 
hardware, farm equipment
dealers 849 790 684 —19 —13
General merchandise stores 365 397 317  13  20
Food stores 1,294 1,175 993 —23 —15
Automotive dealers 490 485 485   1 0
Gasoline service stations 934 1,048 1,075 15 2
Apparel, accessory stores 439 428 450 2 5
Furniture, home furnishings, 
equipment stores 346 343 336 — 3 — 2
Eating, drinking places 2,072 2,170 2,025 — 2 — 7
Eating places 924 1,095 1,063 15 — 3
Drinking places 1,144 1,075 962 —16 —10
Drug, proprietary stores 240 261 260 8 0
Other retail stores 961 968 901 — 6 — 7
Nonstore retailers 233 196 271 16 38
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businesses. Of course, in contrast to some other retail lines, it 
doesn’t take much money for an individual to get into the gaso­
line or the restaurant business. But while increases were oc­
curring in the number of gas stations and cafes, a decline of 
165 (19 percent) in the number of lumber, building materials, 
hardware, and farm equipment dealers was taking place, and 
the number of food stores dropped by 23 percent, from 1,294 to 
933 (Table 2).
It is in the food store group that some of the most pronounced 
changes are taking place. Between 1954 and 1963, the number 
of outlets declined at the same time that combined sales of
TABLE 3
RETAIL SALES IN MONTANA, 1954, 1958, AND 1963 
(thousands of dollars)







Total retail sales 778,033 862,577 965,734 24 12
Lumber, building materials, 
hardware, farm equipment
dealers 105,636 111,176 107,937 2 —  3
General merchandise stores 66,610 74,418 87,635 32 18
Food stores 155,300 191,866 210,378 36 10
Automotive dealers 152,998 162,835 198,218 30 22
Gasoline service stations 55,584 69,319 83,955 51 21
Apparel, accessory stores 36,091 42,899 48,433 34 13
Furniture, home furnish-
ings, equipment stores 32,335 32,343 34,177 6 6
Eating, drinking places 80,815 81,362 89,237 10 10
Drug, proprietary stores 20,909 27,419 31,803 52 16
Other retail stores 67,017 63,419 63,101 — 6 0
Nonstore retailers 4,738 5,521 10,860 129 97
Source: See Table 2.
Montana food stores were expanding faster than sales in most 
other retail lines (Table 3). Clearly, the larger grocery stores— 
the supermarkets—have eliminated many small stores. A good 
many more are likely to disappear in coming years.
During the past ten years, Montanans have been rearranging 
their spending patterns, too. They now spend a smaller part of 
their incomes in eating and drinking places, on furniture, home 
furnishings, and household appliances, and in the lumber, 
building materials, hardware and farm equipment retail 
groups. In contrast, other kinds of businesses—food stores, auto­
mobile dealers, gas stations, department stores, and drug stores
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boosted their share of consumer expenditures in 1963. Of 
particular interest is the fact that Montanans have more than 
doubled their purchases from nonstore retailers such as mail­
order firms and house-to-house salesmen. Like other Ameri­
cans, Montanans also are devoting a larger portion of their con- 
expenditures to personal services; between 1954 and
191 ’ ™ le they Were increasing purchases at retail stores by 
only 24 percent, their spending for services—in hotels and mo-
TABLE 4
RETAIL SALES IN MAJOR MONTANA TRADE CENTERS,
1954, 1958, AND 1963
(thousands of dollars)
City 1954 1958 1963 1 9 &
Greal; Falls 79,884 98,207 119,238 49  21
Billings 83,546 100,916 109,617 31 9
Missoula 43,190 53,238 70,635 64 33
®UJte 61,544 63,673 61,244 0 — 4
£ e ?n a „ 29,333 34,592 41,322 41 19
Kalispell 28,222 28,205 34,653 23 23
Bozeman 19,975 25,147 33,630 68 34
™ vre_.. 21,629 23,141 21,721 0 — 6
Miles City 16,813 20,076 21,380 27 6
Lewistown 14,945 14,802 20,253 36 37
Glasgow 12,722 13,350 19,584 54  47
®ldney . 9.713 11,255 16,129 66  43
Anaconda 15,013 17,686 15,942 6 — 10
Glendive 12,771 11,956 14,831 16 24
Bivmgston 11,743  i 4)879  14,752  2 6 —  1
Total, 15 cities 461,043 531,123 614,931 33 16
Percent of state
sales 59  62 64
Source: See Table 2 .
tels, auto repair shops, beauty and barber shops and so forth— 
rose 55 percent.5
In a report for the Upper Midwest Research and Develop- 
merit Council John R. Borchert and Russell B. Adams classi­
fied retail trade centers and mapped trade areas for the larger
*MontanaGBC ’GCê sus of Busin^ s, 1963> Selected Services,
D. C. 1964BC 63"SA 28, U‘ S- Government Printing Office, Washington,
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centers in Montana and the other Upper Midwest states.0 The 
report recognized four major trade centers in the state: Bil­
lings, Great Falls, Butte, and Missoula. Eleven smaller Mon­
tana towns were classified as complete shopping centers: Ana­
conda, Bozeman, Glasgow, Glendive, Havre, Helena, Kalispell, 
Lewistown, Livingston, Miles City, and Sidney. Trade areas 
were drawn for each of the fifteen centers (Figure 1). Together, 
the trade areas encompass all of Montana except for the ex­
treme northeast corner of the state (Daniels, Sheridan, and 
Roosevelt counties) which is included in the Williston, North 
Dakota trade area.
In 1963, retail establishments in the four larger trade centers 
—Great Falls, Billings, Butte, and Missoula—accounted for 37 
percent of total retail sales in the state and outlets in the eleven 
smaller centers accounted for another 27 percent of sales. This 
left only 36 percent to be divided among retailers in 331 smal­
ler centers and hamlets in Montana.
A quick glance at Table 4 indicates that the leading trade 
centers have had very different experiences in recent years, 
reflecting varying economic developments in their areas. The 
effect of reduced employment in mining and smelting opera­
tions on retailers in Anaconda and Butte is clearly revealed, 
with a decline of 10 percent in sales in Anaconda and of 4 per­
cent in Butte between 1958 and 1963. The disappointing record 
of Billings retailers, especially after 1958, was due partly to the 
loss of some oil company activities.
Federal government programs were a significant influence 
in at least three cities. The 47 percent increase in sales from 
1958 to 1963 in Glasgow was largely attributable to the Air 
Force Base, and missile workers in the Great Falls and Lewis- 
town areas were responsible for high retail sales in those cities 
in 1963, although between 1954 and 1958 both Glasgow and 
Lewistown had been among towns with the least growth in re­
tail sales; indeed, Lewistown had experienced a slight decline. 
In 1964, the year after the Census of Business was taken, sales 
of Great Falls and Lewistown retailers reflected the loss of 
missile workers who had left the area after completion of the 
missile complex; Glasgow apparently will be faced with the 
loss of military personnel in the near future.
“John R. Borchert and Russell B. Adams, T ra d e  C en ters  an d  T rade  
A rea s  of th e  U p p er M id w est, Urban Report Number 3, Upper Midwest 
Research and Development Council, Minneapolis, Minnesota, Septem­
ber 1963.
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A Closer Look at Missoula
On the basis of Census sales figures, Missoula among the four 
larger Montana cities and Bozeman among the smaller towns 
stand out as the retailing centers with the most consistent and 
rapid growth since 1954. Sidney also makes a good showing 
for the years in which the Census was taken; its performance 
has been somewhat erratic, however, chiefly because of its 
heavier dependence on farm income.
Census figures for the state and for cities and counties re­
veal many of the geographic changes taking place in retail 
trade patterns, but they give almost no information about one 
of the most frequently discussed retailing trends within the 
cities—the move away from downtown business areas to neigh­
borhood shopping centers or to business districts on the edge 
of town. This is a nationwide, post-World War II development 
which was a little slow in coming to Montana; it has been espe­
cially noticeable here since the mid-1950’s. Frequently such de­
velopments have increased retailing efficiency or have made 
shopping more convenient. At the same time, some downtown 
business areas have suffered. Small, independent merchants 
sometimes have been hurt by the chain stores which occupied 
the shopping centers. And, in several communities, some people 
have felt that the growth in retail facilities was too rapid, that 
it has outpaced the growth in population and income.
Since Bureau personnel are located in Missoula, a limited 
study of retail growth in that city, where all these problems 
obtain, was undertaken. In addition to a broad survey of retail 
growth in the city, the question of overbuilding of retail facili­
ties was considered. Of course, the results for Missoula should 
not be interpreted as representative of other cities in the state; 
we have already noted that Missoula is not a typical Montana 
town in terms of retail development. However, the study con­
ducted was very simple and the comparisons used might be 
of interest to businessmen in other Montana towns.
Missoula’s trade area, as defined by the Upper Midwest 
study, includes all of Missoula, Sanders, Mineral, Ravalli, and 
Granite counties, the southern half of Lake County (including 
Poison) and the northern half of Powell County. The present 
population of this area is approximately 86,000, with over half 
this number living in the Missoula urban area.7 Other towns in
7Based on State Board of Health county estimates for 1963.
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the trade area include Hamilton with a 1960 population of 
2,475; Poison, with 2,314; and Thompson Falls, Superior, Ronan 
and Philipsburg, all with populations ranging from 1,100 
to 1,400.8
In the whole Missoula trade area population has grown at a 
slightly lower rate than in the state as a whole. Following the 
state pattern of a shift to urban residence, practically all the 
population increase has occurred in the Missoula urban area 
while the surrounding rural areas and the small towns have 
either barely maintained their numbers or have lost residents. 
Between 1950 and 1960, the total population increase for the 
area amounted to 12 percent, compared to 14 percent for Mon­
tana as a whole. But over the same years, Missoula County’s 
population (dominated by the Missoula urban area) increased 
26 percent, while the population of the rest of the trade area 
declined 1 percent.9
In income growth the Missoula trade area surpassed all other 
state areas. Between 1954 and 1962 (latest year for which coun­
ty estimates are available) total personal income increased 
approximately 45 percent in the state and 59 percent in the 
Missoula trade area, from $106.0 million to $168.7 million. 
Again, most of the increase occurred in Missoula County, al­
though neighboring counties also had creditable rates of 
growth; only Mineral County fell below the state norm. In 
spite of the good growth record, per capita incomes in most of 
the area remain low. Only in Missoula County does per capita 
income approach the state figure. In 1960, when per capita in­
come in the state was $2,004, Missoula County had an income 
of $2,015 per person; Sanders and Granite counties had per 
capita incomes of around $1,810 and $1,860, respectively; and 
incomes per person in Lake, Mineral, and Ravalli ranged from 
$1,390 to $1,510.10 . 1 j
Not surprisingly, the rather impressive growth in income in 
the Missoula trade area was accompanied by a rapid expansion
SU. S. Bureau of the Census, C ensus o f P opu la tion : 1960, N u m b er  o f In ­
h a b itan ts, M ontana, Fiscal Report PC(1)-28A, U. S. Government Print­
ing Office, Washington, D. C., 1960.
'In combining county data to establish trade area statistics, the north­
ern half of Powell County, which in 1960 contained 569 persons and 
very little retail activity, was omitted. Data for all of Lake County were 
used, including the northern half of the county with 1,254 residents in 
1960.
“Estimated by the Bureau of Business and Economic Research, Univer­
sity of Montana, Missoula. Per capita income estimates are available 
only for years in which a Census of Population was taken.
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in retail sales. Between 1954 and 1963, according to the Census 
of Business, sales of retail outlets in the area increased 43 per­
cent—compared to a growth of 24 percent for the state as a 
whole. The discrepancy in growth rates has widened since 
1958, with Missoula trade area sales expanding 23 percent and 
total state sales only 12 percent. In view of the population and
TABLE 5
CHANGES IN POPULATION, PERSONAL INCOME, AND RETAIL 
SALES IN MONTANA AND THE MISSOULA TRADE AREA,
SELECTED YEARS
Population
Area 1950 I960 P ercent Change
Montana, total 591,024 674,767 14
Missoula trade area 74,266 83,039 12
Missoula County 35,493 44,663 26
Trade area, except
Missoula County 38,773 38,376 —  1
Personal Income
Area 1954 1962 Percent Change
Montana, total $1,071,000,000 $1,558,000,000 45
Missoula trade area 106,005,000 168,671,000 59
Missoula County 60,074,000 100,141,000 67
Trade area, except
Missoula County 45,931,000 68,530,000 49
Retail Sales
Area 1954 1963 Percent Change
Montana, total $ 778,033,000 $ 965,734,000 24
Missoula trade area 81,884,000 116,797,000 43
Missoula County 48,752,000 78,907,000 62
City of Missoula 43,190,000 70,635,000 64
Trade area, except
city of Missoula 38,694,000 46,162,000 19
Sources: Population- 
Personal income—
—see footnote 8. 
■U. S. Department of Commerce, Office of Business
Economics, S u r v e y  o f  C u r r e n t  B u s in e s s ,  August 1964, and unpub­
lished estimates of the Bureau of Business and Economic Research. 
Retail Sales—see Table 1.
income shifts within the trading area, obviously retailers in 
Missoula benefited the most: between 1954 and 1963, sales in 
the city increased 64 percent and sales in the rest of the trade 
area were up only 19 percent. It is clear that here, as elsewhere 
in the state, the larger trade center is gaining at the expense 
of the smaller towns. Better highways, more automobiles, and
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higher incomes are making long-distance shopping trips rather 
commonplace.
In 1954, combined retail sales in the seven-county Missoula 
trade area amounted to almost $82 million. Fifty-three percent 
of these sales ($43 million) were made by retailers in the city 
of Missoula. By 1963, retail sales in the area were approaching 
$117 million and 60 percent (almost $71 million) were made in 
Missoula. In some kinds of businesses, almost all the 1963 sales 
were made by firms located in Missoula—notably general mer-
TABLE 6
RETAIL TRADE IN THE CITY OF MISSOULA, 1954 AND 1963
Percent
Item  1954 1963 Change
Number of establishments 336 370 10
Number of proprietors 330 325   2
Total sales, current dollars 43,190,000 70,635,000 64
Total sales, 1954 dollars1 43,190,000 65,331,000 51
Average sales per establishment, 
current dollars 128,542 190,905 48
Average sales per establishment,
1954 dollars1 128,542 176,570 37
Adjusted for price changes since 1954 as measured by the consumer 
price index for food and all other commodities.
Source: See Table 1.
chandise and department stores (79 percent), furniture, home 
furnishings, and equipment stores (91 percent), and nonstore 
retailers11 (93 percent). Between 1954 and 1963, the number of 
retail establishments in the city of Missoula increased 10 per­
cent; the number of proprietors decreased, but only 2 percent; 
and employment increased, probably rather modestly. No good 
source of employment data by counties is available. The Census 
of Business employment figures, which show an increase of 48 
percent in retail employment in Missoula, are for one week 
only (the week ending nearest November 15); they are not 
necessarily indicative of the year’s experience. Other sources 
show very different results; for example, the Unemployment 
Compensation Commission reports an increase of 6 percent in 
annual average employment in Missoula County by wholesale
and retail trade establishments combined between fiscal 1955 
and fiscal 1964.
Nonstore retailers include mail order houses, merchandise vending ma- 
chine operators, and house-to-house selling organizations.
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The location of retail stores within the city also changed con­
siderably between 1954 and 1963. Two new shopping centers— 
Missoula’s first—were constructed on a main highway in the 
rapidly growing southwest section of Missoula. Their total 
floor space amounted to approximately 150,000 square feet. 
Other smaller retail facilities were constructed along Highway 
93 for a distance of approximately three-fourths mile. (In ad­
dition, in November 1963 a third shopping center opened for 
business on the eastern edge of Missoula; it is not included in 
any of the data or discussions which follow.)
With the aid of the scale drawings which appear in Insurance 
Maps of Missoula, Montana, published by the Sanborn Map 
Company, the approximate area, in square feet, devoted to sev­
eral different types of retail stores in Missoula in 1954 and 1962 
was determined and the expansion noted. The kinds of busi­
nesses compared were general merchandise (including variety) 
stores; food stores; apparel and accessories stores; furniture, 
home furnishings, and equipment stores; and drug stores. Clas­
sifications used were the same as those in the Census of Busi­
ness; they also appear in the Standard Industrial Classification 
Manual, 1957, and the Supplement to 1957 Edition, published 
in 1963. Estimates of square footage are rough; the figures were 
taken directly from the blueprints with no investigation as to 
what proportion was sales space and what was storage space.
When increases in square footage in the five kinds of busi­
nesses listed above are compared to growth in personal income 
and in retail sales, they appear to be generally reasonable 
(Tables 5 and 7). Only drug stores show a growth in space 
which seems out of line with other measures. Thus, the fear 
of overbuilding of retail facilities in Missoula appears to have 
been unjustified. Even with the addition in late 1963 of a third 
shopping center, at the east entrance to the city, increases in 
square footage seem generally reasonable.
However, the estimates of floor space in Table 7 conceal 
some of the more interesting locational changes which occurred 
between 1954 and 1962, and which are responsible for much of 
the concern about Missoula’s downtown situation. Practically 
all of the increase in facilities occurred along Highway 93, 
either in the two shopping centers or in adjacent areas. While 
these new outlets were being added, the space devoted to gen­
eral merchandise and department stores, apparel, and drugs 
in the downtown area remained about the same. Although the 
furniture group shows a small over-all decline, the subcate-
62 MONTANA BUSINESS QUARTERLY
WHAT’S HAPPENING IN RETAIL TRADE? 63
gory of radio, television, and music shops increased its square 
footage; again, the growth occurred along the 93 Strip.
But it is in the food store group that the most pronounced 
changes have taken place. Between 1954 and 1963, the number 
of food stores declined 28 percent, from 49 to 35, while the 
amount of floor space increased by one-third. All of the net in­
crease can be accounted for in three large chain stores along 
Highway 93. Space devoted to groceries in the downtown and 
North Higgins areas declined sharply. Meanwhile, on a con­
stant (1954) dollar basis, average sales per food store in the 
city of Missoula were 136 percent higher in 1963 than in 1954. 
This may be contrasted with the 37 percent increase in average 
sales of all Missoula retail establishments and with the very 
modest 7 percent increase in average sales per drug store.
It seems clear, then, that rather than overbuilding facilities 
in Missoula, retailers in most cases simply have been adjusting 
to different ways of doing business. This, of course, may not be 
true in other cities in the state; among the larger Montana 
towns Missoula has enjoyed an unusually favorable environ­
ment for retail growth in recent years.
The changes this report has discussed always involve diffi­
cult adjustment problems for some individuals and businesses; 
this has been true in Missoula and in Montana’s other major 
trade centers. In the smaller towns around the state, the grad­
ual erosion of rural customers has created much more difficult 
problems. The movement to the larger urban areas will con­
tinue and the probability is that the number of small-town re­
tailers will continue to decline—a fact which should be care­
fully considered in planning and not allowed to be sentimen­
talized out of awareness.
In the larger towns, there is little doubt that there are ad­
vantages in large-scale retail enterprises, particularly in food 
stores, but in other lines as well. The number of new small, in­
dependent enterprises in Missoula since 1954, however, indi­
cates that opportunities for the small Montana businessmen do 
exist in retailing today. This may not be so in every kind of 
business, nor in every community, but by carefully consider­
ing both his choice of business and of community, as well as 
realistically assessing his own personal qualifications—includ­
ing aptitude, training, and capital—a prospective small retailer 
may reasonably expect a successful venture in Montana.

